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We examine firm profitability in the food economy and determine the source of variance 
of firm profitability in family-owned and non-family-owned food processing firms.  The 
results indicate firm effects dominate in explaining the variance in the business-segment 
performance in the food economy.  More specifically, we find family-owned firms 
compared to non-family-owned firms have a higher percentage of total variance in the 
business-segment performance explained by yearly effects, industy effects, and firm 




1.  Introduction 
 
The U.S. food economy, comprised of food production, processing, wholesale 
distribution, and retailing, accounted for 12.3% of the U.S. GDP in 2001.  Family-owned 
firms are an organizational structure commonly found in the food economy (Ware).  
Much research has been done in the area of closely-held or family-owned businesses.  A 
study by Anderson and Reeb found that family firms outperformed non-family firms over 
the 1992 to 1999 time period.  The authors reported that family firms constituted over 35 
percent of the S&P 500 Industrials and, on average, families owned nearly 18 percent of 
their firms’ outstanding equity during this time period.  Family-owned businesses are 
common among firms in the food economy.  In many cases, the governance of these 
firms is quite complex and the founding family members often control the company even 2 
though they do not own the majority of common stock in many cases.
1  The purpose of 
this study is to analyze firm profitability in the food economy and determine the source of 
variance of firm profitability in family-owned and non-family-owned food processing 
firms. 
 
2.  Previous Literature   
Previous research using data from different time periods has also found similar results to 
that of Anderson and Reeb.  Monsen, Chiu, and Cooley reported that industrial firms who 
were controlled by owners (e.g., family-owned) as opposed to managers (e.g., non-family 
owned) had a higher rate of return over a time period in the early 1960s.  Boudreaux 
found similar results in the late 1960s.  However, a study by Radice found that there were 
no significant differences among owner-controlled and manager-controlled firms. 
  These studies have analyzed U.S. industrial and service firms from a broad cross-
section of data.  Monsen, Chiu, and Cooley reported the presence of a significant industry 
effect.  However, that study did not control for that industry effect.  Controlling for 
industry effects are important as noted by McGahan and Porter (1999), and Schumacher 
and Boland (2005b) when analyzing industry sectors. 
                                                 
1 More information on the unique governance aspects of many of these family-owned companies can be 
found in Boland. 3 
  Ware’s study was the first to look at a single industry (the food and beverage 
industry).
2  Ware regressed a firm size variable (as measured by total assets), a discrete 
subindustry classification variable (four digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)), a 
control variable (binary variable designating whether the firm was controlled by the 
owner or manager), and an interaction term variable of firm size and control on four 
dependent variables: the ratio of net income to equity, the ratio of net sales to number of 
employees, ratio of average annual retained earnings to net income, and ratio of debt to 
assets.  He identified 37 manager-controlled firms and 37 owner-controlled firms in a 
sample of food processors in 1960 and 1970.  Ware’s subindustry discrete categories 
included packaged foods, meat packers, dairy products, canned foods, animal foods, corn 
refineries, biscuit makers, sugar beet and cane refiners, confectionary, brewers, distillers, 
and soft drink companies.  The firm size and interaction variables were not significant in 
any of the four models.  The discrete subindustry variables were not significant except for 
confectionary and soft drinks in the prediction of the ratio of debt to assets. 
  The control variable was significant in the prediction of the ratio of net income to 
equity, ratio of net sales to number of employees, and ratio of average annual retained 
earnings to income.  Owner-controlled food and beverage firms had a higher ratio of net 
sales to number of employees and average annual retained earnings to income.  However, 
                                                 
2 Porter considered agribusinesses and food businesses as marketing products that were sold through 
convenience outlets with little differentiation and used SIC codes to distinguish these industries from non-
convenience goods. 4 
in general, owner-controlled firms did not have a significantly greater ratio of income to 
equity relative to manager-controlled firms. 
  In general, theoretical arguments have been made suggesting that family-owned 
control is less efficient than non-family owned ownership.  Fama and Jensen indicated 
that owners who control a company enable them to receive private rents by restricting 
profits.  Demsetz suggested that family-owned firms may chose to spend profits on 
projects that may not be as profitable.  Faccio, Lang and Young concluded that family 
control leads to wealth expropriation in less than transparent financial markets in East 
Asian companies.  Morck, Strangeland, and Yeung suggested that the literature has found 
that family-controlled ownership is an organizational form that can lead to subpar firm 
performance. 
  However, other literature suggests that family-controlled ownership may be 
desirable.  In particular, descendants of founding families have many incentives to 
monitor the performance of a firm.  For example, their control of the governance 
structure (e.g., directors) may lead to a longer time horizon with regard to strategic 
thinking (James), investment horizons (Stein), and limit management greed (Demsetz and 
Lehn). 
  Ware’s study has been the only study that analyzed owner-controlled and 
manager-controlled firms in the food economy.  The rational for studying firms in the 
food economy as a subset of the entire economy have been described by Sonka and 
Hudson. 5 
  Persistent profits in food businesses are important for family-owned firms.  There 
have been numerous studies that have examined the ability of some firms to earn 
persistently higher returns (Brush, Bromiley, and Hendrickx; McGanhan and Porter, 1997 
and 2002; Mueller; Roquebert, Phillips, and Westfall; Rumelt; Schmalensee; Schumacher 
and Boland (2005b)).  There are two views, industry view and firm view, which have 
emerged as the sources in determining extraordinary firm profits.  Industry view is 
commonly referred to some industries have structural characteristics that deter entry, 
support product differentiation, or limit competition among rivals (McGahan and Porter, 
1997; Schmalensee; Schumaker and Boland (2005b); Waring).  Such structural 
characteristics include economies of scale, advertising intensity, degree of vertical 
integration, degree of product differentiation, and excess capacity.  Firm view argues that 
individual firm performance differs across firms because of unique organizational 
resources and processes (Conner; Mahoney and Pandian; Rumelt; Rumelt, Schendel, and 
Teece).  Such resources and processes include human capital, brand names, and efficient 
management and/or production procedures. 
With the exception of Ware, one limitation of the earlier research on the food 
economy is that the studies do not consider analyzing family-owned businesses from non-
family-owned businesses.  Our research goes beyond Ware’s study by examining more 
four-digit SIC code subindustry categories (e.g., 36 subindustries vs. 13 subindustries) 
and a longer time period (e.g., 22 years vs. 11 years).  In addition, Ware’s study was 
conducted more than 30 years ago as his data spanned 1960 and 1970.  There have been 
many changes in the food processing industry since the publication of that research.  For 6 
instance, between 1963 and 1997, the number of food processing firms declined 32 
percent (e.g., 32,617 firms in 1963 compared to 21,958 firms in 1997) (Harris et al.).  Our 
study not only distinguishes between family-owned and non-family-owned food 
businesses, but captures the changes in the food industry over the last 20 years. 
 
3.  Theoretical Framework 
This analysis uses the following model which was used by Schmalensee, Rumelt, 
McGahan and Porter (1997), and Schumacher and Boland (2005a): 
  ,, ,, , ikt ii k t it tk a r µ δ γβ ε =+++ + +    (1) 
The variables in equation (1) are defined in Table 1. 
The variation in the business-segment returns comes from five sources.  The first 
source is a yearly effect, which captures macroeconomic conditions that affect all 
business-segment performances equally.  The next two sources of variation come from 
industry effects.  Stable industry effects reflect industry attributes that affect firms’ 
profitability.  Transient industry effects represent the business cycle’s influence on the 
industry.
3  Industry-specific impacts on returns including barriers to entry, economies of 
scale, capacity utilization, capital intensity, and industry concentration may be 
explanations for differences among the stable industry effects.  Transient industry effects 
occur when all firms of an industry have high or low profits in year t.  The fourth source 
                                                 
3 In Table 1, Industry effects and Industry x Year effects are referring to stable industry effects and 
transient industry effects, respectively.   
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of variation comes from the firm effect term which represents persistent differences 
among firms due to intangibles that are specific to a firm.  The last source of variation 
comes from the random error term. 
Note that the variance of the dependent variable in equation (1), 
2
r σ , is a linear 
combination of the variances of the independent variables, 
2
γ σ , 
2
a σ , 
2
β σ , 
2
δ σ , and
2
ε σ , 
under the assumption that all the effects are realizations of random processes with zero 
means and constant variances.  The effects in the data represent a random sample of the 
effects in the population (i.e., random-effects).  Independence in the effects implies that 
knowing the value of a particular  k β cannot be used to predict the values of other firm 
effects or the values of any industry or year effects.  The fixed-effects model assumes that 
the effects are fixed and correlated and that the residual terms are random, drawn 
independently from a population with zero mean and an unknown variance.
4 
 
4.  Description of the Data 
Data for this study are obtained from the Standard and Poor Compustat Business-
Segment Reports for business-segments in the food and agribusiness sector for the period 
1980 to 2001.  This data is unique.  For example, one firm may have operations in 
multiple industries and therefore report results under more than one four-digit SIC code.  
Rather than use aggregated data for one firm across all industries, the specific segment 
                                                 
4 Advantages and disadvantages of the random-effects and fixed-effects models are described in 
Schumacher and Boland (2005a). 
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data is used for each firm.  An advantage of using business-segment data as opposed to 
firm level data is that one avoids underestimating industry effects to the extent that the 
firm is diversified beyond its primary industry. 
  The initial data was screened by eliminating industries that contained less than 
three business-segments in any one year and deleting business-segments that had less 
than three years of data.  McGahan and Porter (1997) used Compustat Business-segment 
Reports for years 1981 to 1994 and eliminated business-segments that are the only 
organization covered by Compustat in their SIC classification; business-segments with 
only one year of data, business-segments with sales less than $10 million, and business-
segments with assets less than $10 million.  Hawawini, Subramanian, and Verdin used 
the Stern Stewart data set covering years 1987 to 1996 and eliminated corporations that 
were not reported to be active in the same industry classification over the 10-year period 
of their study. 
  The screened data set (referred to as the full data set) contains 7,224 observations 
across 22 years which includes 44 industries and 668 corporations that comprise 798 
business-segments.  These data include data on firms that supply inputs to agricultural 
production, food processors, grocery wholesaling, retail grocery, and restaurant and was 
used by Schumacher and Boland (2005a).  Table 2 shows the weighted average return on 
assets for the Standard Industrial Classification categories used in this study. 
  The food processing industry sector data was analyzed and a binary variable was 
created that signified whether the firm was family-owned or not family-owned.  This 
sector was chosen because Ware had found that many family-owned firms in the food 9 
and beverage industry were in the SIC category comprising food processing.  Within this 
sector, 32 family-owned food economy firms and 136 non-family-owned food processing 
firms were identified for the 1980 to 2002 time period.  The family-owned firms 
represent many common names such as Anheuser-Busch, Coors, Pilgrim’s Pride, J.M. 
Smuckers Company, and Tyson Foods. 
  Family-owned firms were defined as those firms where one party (individual, 
family, or family-holding company) owned 15 percent or more of the voting stock and 
was represented on the board of directors or in management.  In addition, firms where 
one party owned 25 percent or more stock but was not active in the company was also 
considered to be a family-owned company.  Data from the Corporate Library, Hoovers, 
and the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission were used to determine whether a firm 
was considered family-owned or not.  This determination is similar to Ware and 
Anderson and Reeb. 
 
Methodology 
This study uses the methodology of McGahan and Porter (1997) and Schumacher and 
Boland (2005a) to determine the persistence of profits among firms in the food economy.  
The model includes five sources of variation in business-segment returns: yearly effects, 
stable and transient industry effects, stable firm effects, and a random error.  
Rumelt and McGahan and Porter (1997) estimated the variance in firm 
performance using both the fixed-effects and random-effects mode while Hawawini, 
Subramanian, and Verdin estimated the variance in firm profits using the random-effects 10 
model.  Similar to Schumacher and Boland (2005a), both the fixed-effects and random-
effects methods are used to estimate the source of the variance of firm profitability in this 
study. 
  The model was estimated in SAS® using both a fixed and random-effects model.  
The random-effects model was estimated using the VARCOMP procedure and the fixed 
effects model was estimated using the GLM procedure.  Both procedures provide 
estimates of the source of the variance components of the dependent variable in a general 
linear model when independent variables are identified as class variables.  Four models 
were estimated: 1) a random-effects model for the family-owned firms and a random-
effects model for the non-family owned firms and 2) a fixed-effects model for the family-
owned firms and a fixed-effects model for the non-family owned firms. 
 
Results 
Tables 3 to 4 present the variance components estimates in the second column for the 
random-effects model.  The percentages of the total variance of the dependent variable 
explained by the independent effects of each model are presented in the third column.  
The model explains 71.3 percent and 49.2 percent of the variance of the business-
segment profits for family and non-family owned, respectively, which compare to 72.3 
percent (Full Model) and 68.1 percent (Modified Model) in Schumacher and Boland’s 
(2005a) study. 
  Industry effects in the family-owned business account for 16.3 percent of 
variation in the business-segment performance while 9.1 percent of the variation in the 11 
business-segment performance is accounted for in non-family-owned business.  The 
Industry x Year effects account for 9.2 percent and 3.1 percent of the variation in the 
business-segment performance for family and non-family-owned businesses, 
respectively.  These compare to 2.0 (Full Model) and 6.7 (Modified Model) percent in 
Schumacher and Boland (2005a).  Firm effects account for 44.8 (family-owned) and 35.9 
(non-family-owned) percent of the variation in business-segment performance as 
compared to 49.3 (Full Model) and 43.6 (Modified Model) percent in Schumacher and 
Boland’s (2005a) study. 
The industry persistence rates are defined as the sum of the Industry and Industry 
x Year effects.  These persistence rates are 45.2 (32.35 + 12.85) and 53.62 (42.70 + 
10.92) for family-owned and non-family owned firms, respectively.
5  These compare to 
47.7 (Full Model) and 38.4 (Modified Model) in Schumacher and Boland (2005a).  
  Tables 5 and 6 present the results for the fixed-effects models.  All effects are 
found to be significantly different from zero at the 0.01 significance level.  The firm 
effects are less than those found in the random-effects model.  In contrast, the industry 
effects between the random-effects and fixed-effects models are quite different.  These 
are 3.45 and 3.12 percent, respectively, for the family-owned and non-family owned 
firms in the fixed-effects model.  These are similar to Schumacher and Boland’s (2005a) 
rates of 3.1 (Full Model) and 2.2 (Modified Model) percent, respectively.  Firm effects 
                                                 
5 Persistence is defined as the ability of a firm to repeat its performance over time.  Firms can increase or 
decrease their performance over time.  However, the ability to repeat superior performance suggests that 
some firms have competitive advantages due to Industry or Firm effects. 
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are higher for the family-owned firms (59.23 percent) relative to the non-family-owned 
(48.69 percent). 
 
5.  Summary and Implications 
Across the random and fixed-effects models for both family and non-family-owned 
businesses, the firm effects dominate in explaining the variance in the business-segment 
performance in the food economy.  Both Industry effects and Industry x Year effects are 
smaller than the firm effects across all four models.  The industry persistence rates for the 
random-effects model is 45.2 and 46.2 for the family and non-family-owned businesses.  
These findings are consistent with Schumacher and Boland (2005a). 
  This study does not address the determinants of return on assets.  McGahan and 
Porter (2002) note that this is a fruitful research topic.  Boland analyzed governance 
variables similar to Anderson and Reeb and found that many of these were significant for 
family-owned firms.  Domine found that asset turnover, working capital turnover, the 
standard deviation of return on assets for an individual firm, and a measure of credit 
worthiness (Z-score) were significant variables in explaining return on assets for food 
processors.    
  One limitation of this study is that it requires a three year unbroken series of 
observations to be included in our data set, which creates survival bias as in prior studies.  
In addition, some family firms such as Cargill are not publicly held and thus are not in the 
Compustat data.  Firm effects are larger for the family-owned food firms indicating that 
this effect is more important.  Cooperatives are also not included in the data.  However, 13 
many cooperatives have characteristics of family-owned firms as noted by Boland.  This 
suggests that other variables such as governance structure or strategy should be analyzed 
to learn more about these firm effects.  Nevertheless, this topic provides opportunities for 
future research in this area and the issue of the importance of firm effects among family-
owned food firms.  14 
 Table 1. Definition of the Variables in the Model. 
Variable Definition 
ri,k,t
a,b  return on assets (ROA) of a business-segment unit in year t of corporation k 
participating in industry i (where i = food processing in this study) 
µ   the average profit over the entire period for all business-segments 
t γ   the difference between µ and the average profit over the entire period for all 
business-segments in year t (also referred to as the year effect) 
i a   the increment to profit associated with participation in industry i (also referred 
to as the industry effect) 
k β   the increment to profit associated with the business-segment participation in 
firm k (also referred to as the firm effect) 
, it δ   are the increment to profit associated with participation in industry i in year t 
(also referred to as the industry-year interaction effect) 
,, ikt ε   the residual term with a zero mean 
a Profitability is defined as return on assets (ROA) in this study.  This is similar to what was used by 
McGahan and Porter and Schumacher and Boland (2005a).  
b A business-segment is defined as the portion of a company’s operations reported under a single four-digit 
SIC code.  
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Table 2. Mean Industry Return on Assets (ROA) for Processing Firms, 1980 to 2001 
Industry Name                                                                                         SIC       ROA 
Food and kindred products  2000  14.0%
Meat packing  2011  8.4%
Sausages and other prepared meats  2013  12.6%
Poultry slaughtering and processing  2015  13.1%
Dairy products  2020  18.8%
Ice cream and frozen desserts  2024  8.3%
Fluid milk  2026  12.9%
Canned, frozen, and preserved fruits and vegetables  2030  16.9%
Canned fruits, vegetables, preserves, jams and jellies  2033  10.0%
Dried and dehydrated fruits, vegetables, and soup mixes  2034  12.0%
Pickled fruits and vegetables  2035  22.5%
Frozen fruits, juices, and vegetables  2037  9.9%
Frozen specialties, not elsewhere classified  2038  0.9%
Flour and other grain mill products  2041  14.5%
Cereal breakfast foods  2043  22.4%
Wet corn milling  2046  10.9%
Prepared feed and feed ingredients   2048  15.2%
Break and other bakery products  2051  11.9%
Cookies and crackers  2052  4.5%
Cane sugar, except refining  2061  5.0%
Beet Sugar  2063  10.3%
Candy and other confectionery products  2064  31.2%
Chocolate and cocoa products  2066  16.3%
Soybean oil mills  2075  6.7%
Animal and marine fats and oils  2077  8.2%
Shortening, table oils, and margarine  2079  11.4%
Malt beverages  2082  7.2%
Wines, brandy and brandy spirits  2084  8.2%
Distilled and blended liquors  2085  14.6%
Bottled and canned soft drinks  2086  12.1%
Flavoring extracts and flavoring syrups  2087  18.5%
Prepared fresh or frozen fish and seafoods  2092  -0.8%
Roasted coffee  2095  16.9%
Potato chips, corn chips, and similar snacks  2096  9.1%
Macaroni, spaghetti, Vermicelli, and noodles  2098  7.6%
Food preparations, not elsewhere classified  2099  0.2%
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Effects in percentage of total 
variance of the dependent variable
Year 2.01  1.01%
Industry 32.35  16.25%



















 for variable 
Effects in percentage of total 
variance of the dependent variable
Year 0.32  1.08%
Industry  42.70 9.1%
Industry x Year  10.92  3.12%
Firm 70.64  35.94%
 
MODEL 124.58  49.24%
Error 25.03  50.76%
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Table 5.  Fixed-Effects Model Results for the Family-Owned Food Processing Firms 
Source d.f.  Incremental  R
2 F-statistic
Year 22  1.01  7.12
*
Industry  13 3.45  14.51
*
Industry x year  286  5.12  1.65
*
Firm 136  59.23  19.55
*
    
MODEL 457  68.81  12.23
*
Error  1443 31.19 
Total 1900   




Table 6.  Fixed-Effects Model Results for the Non-Family-Owned Food Processing Firms 
Source d.f.  Incremental  R
2 F-statistic
Year 22  0.75  6.51
*
Industry 13  3.12  13.28
*
Industry x year  286 5.80  1.71
*
Firm 32  48.69  13.37
*
    
MODEL 353  58.35  9.18
*
Error 1112  41.65 
Total  1465  
An asterisk indicates significance at the 0.01 level. 18 
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